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SHOULD "LAST CLEAR CHANCE" SURVIVE IN THE WORLD
OF DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS?
In Pierre v. LandryI the supreme court found in favor of the plaintiff,
a contributorily negligent pedestrian, by holding that the defendant driver
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The court's analysis of the
facts showed that defendant had a reasonable opportunity to avoid injuring
plaintiff after becoming aware of plaintiff's peril.
It is submitted that if the duty-risk analysis is to be used to its fullest
extent in our tort law,2 the doctrine of last clear chance must be aban-
doned, for the pure atmosphere of the duty-risk world will not support the
existence of such a fiction.
The typical last clear chance case, which Pierre undoubtedly was,
lends itself easily to the duty-risk analysis with the simple statement that
the plaintiff's duty to care for himself does not encompass the risk that he
will be injured by a party who has observed his peril and failed to seize the
opportunity to avoid injuring him. Thus the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is eliminated, for no duty is breached, and the endless badminton
game of batting negligences back and forth between plaintiff and defend-
ant is terminated. Happily, the even more ominous briar patch of antece-
dent negligence and the like would also have had its last clear chance to
survive.
PREMISES LIABILITY-THE DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE-
INVITEE-LICENSEE-TRESPASSER ABOLITION
Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative Inc. ,3 a Louisiana Su-
preme Court decision of a prior term, announced in dictum that the
traditional categories of invitee, licensee, and trespasser were of little help
in applying Civil Code article 2315. More particularly, the court said that
the proper test to be applied under Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 in
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 341 So. 2d 891 (La. 1977).
2. See, e.g., Shelton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976).
3. 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976).
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premises liability cases was to determine whether the defendant acted as a
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others; and that
"although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in
light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the
question of liability, the status is not determinative.'"'
In Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,1 the court for the first
time disposed of a premises liability case by applying the standard pro-
nounced in Cates. The plaintiff in Shelton was an elderly woman who
slipped and suffered serious personal injuries while on her son's premises.
Her accident was caused by a substance collected on the ground as residue
from the son's washing the flaking paint from his garage. The court found
that the son owed no duty to protect his mother against the condition
created by the washing operation because "the landowner is not liable for
an injury resulting from a condition which should have been observed by
an individual in the exercise of reasonable care or which was as obvious to
a visitor as to the landowner."6
Under the categories analysis, the court might have disposed of the
case on essentially the same basis by saying that there was no duty of the
landowner to warn about or to correct a condition which was reasonably
apparent to the victim, whether she was classified as an invitee or licensee.
It should be noted that the foregoing analysis was applied as part of
the now traditional duty-risk approach. The court here first found that the
washing residue was the cause in fact of the injury because all agreed that
the plaintiff had slipped on it. Cause in fact alone will not establish
liability, however, and the second consideration was whether the land-
owner was under a duty to protect plaintiff against the risk of injury from
the condition which was found to be the cause. Since the court found no
duty to protect against injury from this particular condition, it was not
necessary to take up what would have been the next consideration, i.e.,
whether or not a duty to protect the victim was breached.
"NEGLIGENCE PER SE" BY VIRTUE OF HAZARDOUS OCCUPATION
In Dyson v. Gulf Modular Corp. I the supreme court correctly held
that contributory negligence could not be found from the mere fact that
4. Id. at 37, citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561,
568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
5. 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976).
6. Id. at 410.
7. 338 So. 2d 1385 (La. 1976).
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decedent was engaged in the hazardous undertaking of working in close
proximity to a high voltage electric line. Decedent was unloading prefab-
ricated house components from a trailer when the cable used for that
purpose came in contact with the power line and caused decedent's death
by electrocution.
The holding is consistent with the position taken by the court in
Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp. 8 There, a fireman failed to put on his
gas mask while engaged in rescuing individuals endangered by gas escap-
ing from the defendant's plant. The court said, "Firemen, police officers,
and others who in their professions of protecting life and property neces-
sarily endanger their safety do not assume the risk of all injury without
recourse against others. " 9
8. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
9. Id. at 1088, 249 So. 2d at 141.
